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Comments on Hill:
“Punishment, Conscience, and Moral Worth”
Nelson Potter
University of Nebraska-Lincoln
This is an interesting paper to me, among other reasons, because it deals
with both halves of Kant’s Metaphysics of Morals; that fact alone also makes
it somewhat unusual. It proposes in particular that there is a kind of analogy between conscience as an inner voice of morality and punishment as
a provider of incentives against antisocial actions through punishment as
deterrence.
As Hill points out, there has been quite a lot of discussion of Kant’s
views on punishment, but not much about his views of conscience. Nevertheless, there remain scholarly puzzles about Kant’s views on punishment, and there is hope that we can learn something about Kant’s views
on punishment by drawing out the comparisons with conscience, as well
as learning more about conscience. Such comparisons help to make clearer
than ever a fact about Kant’s theory of punishment that I think both Hill
and I agree on and find worth emphasizing, viz., that Kant’s discussion of
punishment is not simply a presentation of isolated moral intuitions about
the deserts of felons, and the appropriate anger we direct toward malefactors. It is rather in a variety of ways embedded within, and very much an
outcome of Kant’s general theory of morality.
Kant himself has little to say about connections between the two parts of
Metaphysics of Morals, and yet we have much to learn from teasing out the
relevant points of comparison. One such connection that is important in
Hill’s discussion, and that I take to be both important and correct, is that
we have a (qualified) ethical duty to obey the law. Hill’s account of the
motivation that a morally good person would have for obeying the law
is, I think, correct and important, and helps us to bring Recht and Tugend
into closer relation; this account of how our duty to obey the law works
can also help us see that punishment is not only a topic in law or external
duty, but is a legal topic with a moral background.
Let me briefly explore another such connection between the two parts:
Kant does not say, but I think we must assume, that for an individual to
be properly subject to punishment, he or she must possess inner freedom.
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Hence, it is not appropriate to punish cats or machines that malfunction,
and for a similar rationale it is not appropriate to punish unintentional
acts or acts that are the product of mental illness, unless there is at least an
indirect connection with human intention, and hence freedom.
Here is another connection between Recht and Tugend that should be
of interest: If an individual acts badly, we can fairly reliably infer a bad
intention. However, we cannot reliably infer good intentions from good
actions. The act of giving to charity may be done for all sorts of morally
neutral or even bad motives, and we are not, in general, able to infer good
motives. But an evil action can hardly flow from a good intention, and
hence there is a lack of symmetry.
Hence, we can say that if someone performs a punishable act, there is
also an inner moral evil (intent or attitude) in the one punished. Or, to put
the point in something like the contrapositive: No one should be subject
to punishment unless there is an inner moral evil present in that person.
This would be true even if we take the position that the only appropriate thing to be punished is the external act, rather than the inner intent.
And we should also be clear that it would be wrong to punish a mere evil
intent that was never manifested in action. E.g., Gloria has a great hatred
for her ex-landlord, but she successfully resists the strong impulse to do
him harm, or even, she never seems to have enough time successfully to
stalk and shoot him; if her evil intent leads to no overt act, she would not
be punishable.
Let us ask concerning Kantian autonomy: How can it be compatible with
autonomy to have one’s behavior forcibly interfered with, as it is when the
individual is punished, e.g., given a prison sentence? If we speak initially
in terms of “outer freedom,” we can say that punishment is intended to
resist wrongful interferences with others’ freedom, which is what punishable offenses are. Punishing a bank robber makes clear the state’s position
that such an action is wrong, and deters the punished person and others
from performing such acts, thereby preserving a rightful range of freedom
for external action of banks and depositors. Further, to mention a point
that Herbert Morris makes in “Persons and Punishment,”1 the punishment system maximizes freedom by not interfering with anyone’s behavior until the individual actually acts wrongly, and violates a law; this was
one way in which a social system of punishment compares favorably with
a social system of therapy, in Morris’ view.
So the punishment system, by deterring antisocial acts, preserves external freedom. Well, one might reply, it does so only by interfering in a very
serious way with the autonomy of the person punished. But then Kant
could reply, that there are two sorts of freedom-lawless, wild freedom,
which he is not interested in, and freedom as acting in accord with practical requirements on action, including moral requirements. Punishment

Comments on Hill

75

is a hindrance to a hindrance of (external) freedom, and is in this system
consistent with autonomy.
We can imagine a similar kind of dialogue concerning inner freedom.
Consider an individual’s freedom, which she might forcibly insist upon,
to drink herself into a drunken stupor. Imagine moral suasion being applied to such a stupor-prone individual, whether from herself or from others. It might be urged that refraining from such indulgences would be
an interference with personal autonomy, and that moral considerations,
which would wish to pull one back from such free behavior, even if they
come from inside oneself, are incompatible with true self-determination.
A person who is constantly on guard against personal indulgence was described in the 60s as “up tight” and the thought was that such an individual was lacking in a certain important sort of personal freedom. But Kant’s
reply is that only moral freedom is true freedom, and in this sense such
self-constraint is an act in favor of personal freedom. Here, it will be noticed, the imagined Kantian replies to complaints that either punishment
or moral self-constraint would be anti-autonomy, are closely analogous.
Finally, let me consider the question of whether the Kantian conscience
has a motivational role. Hill seems to want to affirm a motivational role for
the Kantian conception of conscience. Let me construct an interpretation
of the Kantian conscience according to which the motivational role would
continue to be played by the agent’s Willkür (faculty of choice) rather than
specifically by conscience.
Kant insists that we cannot have an obligation to have a conscience, and
that we would be just lacking a moral nature if we did not have a conscience
at all. What is usually being said when we say that someone does not have
a conscience is that such a person does not listen to her conscience. But
what the conscience is “ ... is practical reason holding man’s duty before
him for his acquittal or condemnation in every case that comes under a
law” (MS, Ak., VI, 400). I read this as saing that conscience itself does not
motivate; the possibility of being moved by conscience is instead left to
the agent’s Willkür. The duty that relates to conscience, Kant tells us (Ak.
VI, 401) is “... to cultivate one’s conscience, to sharpen one’s attentiveness
to the voice of the inner judge and to use every means to obtain a hearing
for it ...” Hence, we have only indirect duties with respect to conscience,
and our direct duties relate to our responsiveness to conscience.
The comparison, then, would be not just between conscience and punishment, both of which are motivators to moral action. Rather, the fuller
comparison is between the criminal justice system of laws, including punishment, and the inner set of faculties of choice that include conscience.
Conscience is most directly comparable to “law,” for each in its way puts
before us salient characteristics of action as being morally relevant, especially in a negative way. So we can get analogous inner conversations:
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“Driving while drunk is against the law, and that must be a reason for
thinking it morally wrong as well. That suggests I have a conclusive moral
reason for refraining.” “My conscience tells me that defrauding my uncle
out of his inheritance is wrong. I can’t seem to discover the error of that
way of thinking (i.e., by my conscience), and so what I did must have
been morally wrong. I should consider whether there is some way to undo
what I did.” Both law and conscience are moral signposts, signals of salience, one in the internal realm, one in the external realm.
In the case of the external signpost, the law, we understand the mere
statement of law to be connected with provisions for criminal punishment, which would move us if no moral consideration did, to refrain from
breaking the law. The incentive that is specially connected with law is an
external one, viz., threat of punishment.
In the case of the internal signpost, one’s conscience, we understand the
judgments about morality that it supplies us with, and we (viz., our faculty of choice) respond in some good or not so good way. Our Willkür may
not be listening at all, in which case no response; we may be tuned into the
message of conscience, in which case we move away from the wrongful
choice through the self-constraint of moral motivation.
Perhaps a reason why there has not been much discussion of Kant on
conscience is because by itself, and apart from a moral self that listens to
and responds to its deliverances, it is an incomplete faculty. Kant insists
that we cannot have a duty to have a conscience, and that we cannot have
a direct duty to develop our conscience—either idea leads to an unacceptable regress. Rather, what we develop is our responding system, the
moral self, the Willkür.
In the case of the institution of punishment, the laws, and the criminal justice system must both be constructed within the state, and there is
much more to be said about how this construction is to proceed, though
not in this comment. Thus, we get Kant’s theory of the state, and of punishment.
The analogy is between (1) in Recht a mere precept of law and the motivation that is added to obeying this precept by the provision of punishment, and (2) in Tugend the precept provided by conscience and the
motivation provided by Willkür. This way of stating the analogy is suggested by Kant’s remarks in the general introduction to his Metaphysics of
Morals:
In all lawgiving (whether it prescribes internal or external actions, and
whether it prescribes them a priori by reason alone or by the choice of another) there are two elements: First, a law, which represents an action that
is to be done as objectively necessary; and second, an incentive, which connects a ground for determining choice to this action subjectively with the
representation of the law.2
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Both the institutions of criminal punishment, and even conscience are
consequences of human imperfection, I think. They both swing into action
only when there is a prospect of serious wrongdoing. If all individuals
acted morally perfectly, there would be no criminal violations, and the institutions of criminal justice would wither away. In fact, it might be urged
that in a society of morally perfect finite beings, the state would not be
necessary, and that all we need to move to a satisfying state of anarchism,
would be for all of us to modify ourselves into morally perfect finite beings. Analogously, such a morally perfect individual would, I think, never
hear the voice of conscience, and, we might add, a person possessed of
perfect virtue after the model of Aristotle also might never hear that voice.
If that is correct, then conscience acquires the importance it has in Kant’s
moral philosophy because of Kant’s characteristic idea that there is so often a conflict between duty and inclination.
NOTES
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Herbert Morris, “Persons and Punishment,” Monist (1968) 52(4): 475-501.
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Immanuel Kant, Metaphysics of Morals, $3 Ak., VI 218f.

